

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Conference on Instability in the USSR

FROM: D/OGI  
3G00 HQS

EXTENSION

NO.

DDI-03523X-88

DATE

1 Nov 88

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.  
Chief, FSIC  
3G04 HQS

11/2

2.

3.  
Director of Global Issues  
3G00 HQS

3 NOV 1988

4.  
DDI5.  
Executive Registry  
7E12 HQS

07 NOV 1988

6.

7.  
Executive Director

08 NOV 1988

8.

9.  
Deputy Director of  
Central Intelligence

9 NOV

10.

11.  
Director of Global Issues  
3G00 HQS

12.

13.

14.

15.

STAT

via DDI

9. For will attend/decline

DCI  
EXEC

[Stamp: 035234/88]

NOV 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [Redacted]

Director of Global Issues

SUBJECT: Conference on Instability in the USSR

Bob

1. Action Requested: We would be honored if you could attend the conference and deliver the opening remarks on 12 December.

2. Background: OGI is sponsoring a two-day conference, planned jointly with SOVA, on prospects for instability in the Soviet Union. The conference will be held at Airlie House on 12-13 December 1988. A host of experts on the Soviet Union and political instability will participate including Jerry Hough, Samuel Huntington, Peter Reddaway, Eric Norlinger, Jeremy Azrael, and Lucien Pye.

3. Your substantive knowledge and interest in the Soviet Union and your key role in developing our analysis on instability make you an ideal choice for such an address. Should your schedule not permit you to open the conference, we would welcome the opportunity for you to speak at lunch on either day or deliver the opening remarks on the second day of the conference.

4. Attached is a conference schedule for your information. We hope you will be able to join us and participate in the conference.

Attachment:  
As stated

Will AttendDecline

*Can't do it - but would love to see  
proceedings of the Conference*

SUBJECT: Conference on Instability in the USSR

STAT OGI/FSIC/ [ ] (1 Nov 88)

Distribution:

Orig - addressee w/att (for return to originator)

- 1 - ExDir
- 1 - ExRegistry
- 1 - D/OGI
- 1 - C/FSIC/OGI
- 1 - DI Registry

## Prospects for Political Instability in the Soviet Union

Conference at Airlie House 12-13 December 1988

### Conference Objectives

This two day conference will bring together some 75 Soviet specialists, political science experts on comparative politics and dramatic political change, and analysts from the intelligence community to discuss the prospects for political instability in the Soviet Union. Specifically, we are interested in exploring scenarios of mass-based as well as elite-based opposition to the current leadership and the potential for a major change in policy, regime, or system. Drawing on a wide range of expertise, the presentations and discussions should provide some tentative answers to the following questions.

What insights can we gain from past episodes of political turmoil in Russian and Soviet history that may help assess current prospects for Mr. Gorbachev and his program?

What are the lessons learned from East European attempts at reform and are they applicable to the Soviet Union today?

What does the comparative work on political instability provide in the way of theories and/or analytical frameworks that would be helpful in understanding political change and the potential for instability in the Soviet Union?

What might the "dynamic" process of regime-threatening political instability in the Soviet Union look like? What factors would be important to mobilization of opposition groups? What role might external players or events play? What are the likely regime responses to either elite-based or mass-based opposition and are they likely to ameliorate or to aggravate the situation? What combination of factors or events could produce heightened nationalities violence (including insurgency or civil war), widespread collective political opposition to the regime, a military coup, or a political coup from either conservative or radical elites?

Can reform proceed relatively smoothly under Gorbachev or his allies? What factors/conditions would have to apply to this "success" scenario?

What are the implications for the United States of growing political problems for Gorbachev? How might Soviet foreign policy be affected by internal political stress?

**Page Denied**

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied